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ARGUMENT
Appellants hereby submit the following reply in this appeal
from the district court's grant of "summary judgment" against
appellants' petition to review an administrative decision of the
Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corporation, granting a
variance to the Market Street Broiler & Fish Market to build a
garbage dumpster enclosure without providing the ten foot
landscaped rear yard and buffer required by city ordinances.
Four appellees are named in this appeal.

TTJ Partnership

and Gastronomy, Inc., are entities related to the Market Street
Broiler & Fish Market, and John Williams is a principal in TTJ
Partnership and Gastronomy, Inc.

None of these three appellees

have bothered to file an opposing brief.

Their failure to defend

against this appeal implies they admit the arguments set forth in
appellants' brief.
While the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corporation
filed a responsive brief (oddly calling its brief in opposition a
"reply" brief), the Board failed to address the main issues
raised in appellants' main brief—first, the Board of
Adjustment's failure to make any findings of fact relevant to the
statutory conditions for granting a variance, renders its
decision arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, and second, the
Board's failure to apply the correct legal standards for granting
illegal.

a variance rendered its decision

Instead of responding to the merits of appellants' main
arguments, the Board's brief first focuses on appellants' third
1

issue—the appropriateness of the district court's applying
summary judgment procedures to what is essentially an appeal
Then the Board throws out four "grounds" the district court
have used to grant summary judgment.

could

As the Board of Adjustment

points out, it not entirely clear what the basis of the court's
ruling was, since the court did not issue a written statement of
the ground for its decision as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
A fair reading of the Board's motion for summary judgment and
supporting memorandum indicate that the motion contained two
grounds: (1) that the Board of Adjustment's decision is supported
by substantial evidence in the record; and (2) that the Board of
Adjustment is not a proper party to the petition for review.
ruling from the bench, however, the court indicated that his
decision was based on the first ground: that the agency's
decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The alternate grounds for summary judgment argued by the
Board of Adjustment are mere straw men.

These arguments

demonstrate the absurdity of the use of summary judgment
procedures to dispose of a petition to the district court to
review an administrative decision.
I. The Board of Adjustment is An Indispensable Party to a Review Proceeding
Citing no authority whatever, the Board of Adjustment
baldly asserts that it is not a proper party, as it does not
have the capacity to sue or be sued. It is, however,
elementary law that the Board of Adjustment is a proper
party respondent.

In fact, in most jurisdictions, the board
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In

of adjustment is considered an indispensable

party.

83 Am

Jur 2nd Zoning and Planning § 1043 (Lawyers Cooperative
1992);

4 Ziegler, Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning and Planning

§ 42.05 at 42-47

(Clark Boardman Callaghan 1995).

In

considering the proper or necessary parties respondent, one
authority writes:
The board whose decision is sought to be
reviewed must be a party. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts has noted that if the
members of the board could not be made defendants,
there would be many instances when no one could be
made a defendant and no suit could be brought. In
some jurisdictions, the board of appeals is the
only indispensable party to an appeal from the
board's decision. This may derive from the nature
of the writ of certiorari, on which review
proceedings are based, where the only
indispensable party defendant was the agency which
had custody of the record to be certified and sent
to the court for review.
4 Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 42.05 at
42-47.

(Footnotes omitted).

In accord with the above authorities, the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act provides that a party seeking
judicial review of a state agency's action must file a petition
naming "the

agency

respondents."

and all other appropriate parties as

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(b).

The Board of Adjustment's assertion that the Board is not an
entity with the capacity to sue or be sued illustrates the
confusion resulting from treating an appeal from an
administrative decision like an ordinary lawsuit.
not a suit.

Appellees are not "suing" anybody.

"complaint" here.

This case is
There is no

There are no damages being sought.
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There is

no trial.

There is no discovery.

The conventional trappings of

a lawsuit, including pretrial motions, such as motions for
summary judgment, do not "fit" a petition to review an
administrative decision because the petition is essentially an
appeal, not a "suit."

Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42

F.3d 1560, 1579-1580 (10th Cir. 1994).

(holding that motions to

affirm and motions for summary judgment are inconsistent with the
federal APA, and prohibiting the use of such procedural devices
in administrative appeals).

II. Marshalling the Evidence is Unnecessary Where the Findings Below are
Legally Insufficient
The Board of Adjustment argues that petitioners' failure to
marshal the evidence in support of the Board's decision is
sufficient grounds for granting the Board's motion for summary
judgment.

This assertion misses petitioners' main point on

appeal—the Board made no findings.

At least, the Board made no

findings relevant to the statutory standards it was obligated to
apply to the evidence.

Without adequate findings, the court

cannot review an administrative agency's decision.

Milne Truck

Lines v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986).
Where the agency or lower court's findings are absent,
conclusory, or legally insufficient, marshaling the evidence is
not required.

Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990,

993 n. 3 (Utah 1993) (appellants are not required to marshal the
evidence where appellants' argument is that the trial court did
not comply with the applicable rules as a matter of law in

4

granting a permanent injunction); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d
635, 638 (Utah App. 1995) (appellants need not engage in a futile
marshaling exercise if they can demonstrate the findings are
legally insufficient); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah
App. 1991) (appellants need not marshal the evidence where
court's findings are conclusory).

the

Here, petitioners contend that

the Board's sole "finding" is legally insufficient.

The Board of

Adjustment applied an incorrect legal standard in granting the
variances. Petitioners are not required to marshal the evidence
relied on by the Board of Adjustment in making its decision where
petitioners' argument is based on the legal insufficiency of the
Board's findings.
Here again, the Board's argument that petitioners failed to
marshal the evidence demonstrates the procedural quagmire
resulting from trying to dispose of a petition to review under
summary judgment procedures and standards.

Utah R. Civ P. 56

does not contain a marshaling requirement—such a requirement
would be inconsistent with the purpose of summary judgment.

In

appealing a grant of summary judgment, the appellant's burden is
merely to show the appeals court that a material fact is
disputed, or that the lower court misinterpreted or misapplied
the law.

Marshaling all the evidence in support in support of

the lower court's decision would not assist the appeals court in
evaluating the appropriateness of summary judgment under either
standard for granting summary judgment.

Marshaling is helpful,

however, where the standard is whether the lower court or
agency's findings

are supported by substantial evidence.
5

The

substantial evidence test applies in an appellate context, while
summary judgment is a tool of the trial court.

Here, the Board

of Adjustment wants to have it both ways.

III. The Reviewing Court Does Not Owe the Board's Decision Any Deference
Where the Board Overstepped the Boundaries of its Legislatively
Delegated Authority
The Board of Adjustment argues that the reviewing court must
affirm the Board's decision if, in light of the evidence, a
"reasonable" person could have reached the same conclusion as the
Board, and that the Board's actions must be accorded substantial
deference.

Even if true—the Board has misstated the standard—

these arguments completely miss the point of this appeal.
Petitioners' appeal is based on the Board's application of the
wrong legal standard and the legal insufficiency of its findings.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 contains a two-pronged standard of
review of decisions of a municipal board of adjustment: the court
may not affirm the Board's decision if (1) the decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal;

or (2) the decision is not

supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Board keeps
dropping the word "illegal" from the phrase, "arbitrary and
capricious."

In Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah

1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that the board of adjustment's
decision to grant a variance was arbitrary and capricious where
there was simply no evidence in the record to support any one of
the board's boilerplate findings, and what evidence existed
tended only to support a denial of the variance. Id.
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at 1135.

This case is just like Chambers v. Smithfield City, except that
here, the Board of Adjustment did not even make boilerplate
findings.
Patterson v, Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602
(Utah App. 1995) and Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah
1981), cited by the Board of Adjustment, are inapplicable to this
case, because both involve "special exceptions," not "variances,"
to the zoning ordinances. The standards governing special
exceptions are different than those governing variances.

A board

of adjustment may grant a variance only if five very specific
conditions set out by the Utah legislature in Utah Code Ann. §
10-9-707 (2) are met.

The state legislature, however, permits

the local legislative body to devise its own standards for
allowing special exceptions.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-706 (2). The

zoning ordinances at issue in Patterson and Thurston contained
very broad standards.

A board of adjustment necessarily

exercises wide discretion in deciding whether to grant a special
exception.
443-444.

See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 605; Thurston, 626 P.2d at
Boards of adjustment do not enjoy the same latitude

with variances because the state legislature has imposed
stringent standards on granting variances, which the boards of
adjustment are bound to follow.
The Board quotes Thurston v. Cache County for the
proposition that the board's decisions are afforded a strong
presumption of validity.

The Board, however, omitted the first

part of the paragraph which greatly qualifies any such
presumption:
7

County zoning authorities are bound by the terms
and standards of the applicable zoning ordinance, and
are not at liberty either to grant or deny conditional
use permits in derogation of legislative standards.

Within

the boundaries

established

by such

standards,

however, the zoning authority is afforded a broad
latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded
a strong presumption of validity.
Thurston, 626 P.2d at 444-445.

(Emphasis added).

Here, the Board simply ignores petitioners' contention that
the Board acted out of the boundaries of the legislative
standards by failing to make any findings regarding the criteria
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(2)(a).

Any presumption of

validity or deference to its technical experience in planning and
zoning that the Board enjoyed is lost when the Board oversteps
the boundaries of its delegated authority.

Sandy City v. Salt

Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992).
The Board further argues that the Board is not required to
make specific findings.

This argument is specious.

In

subsection 2(b), the statute explicitly prohibits a board of
adjustment from "finding" the existence of unreasonable hardship
unless certain conditions are met, and it proscribes the
conditions under which the Board "may find" the existence of
special circumstances.

The legislature clearly expected boards

of adjustment to make specific findings relevant to each of the
statutory criteria.
Next, the Board recites several pieces of "evidence" that it
contends support the statutory criteria even though the Board did
not make specific findings. The Board is wrong—this evidence has
no bearing on the legal criteria.
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(1) At the hearing, there was conflicting evidence as to the
location of the Market Street Broiler's dumpsters over the past
ten years.

Nevertheless, the fact that the dumpsters had been

illegally squatting in the rear yard-buffer for the past ten
years does not support a finding of unreasonable hardship or
special circumstances as defined by the statute and case law.
(2) The fact that the Market Street Broiler generates a
large amount of trash and does not have the space to store it
inside the building is evidence of a self-imposed and personal
hardship, not a hardship related to the property, as more fully
explained in petitioners' main brief on appeal.
(3) The Market Street Broiler's ability to provide a buffer
to the south parking lot adjacent to its building was also
disputed during the hearing.

In any event, the south parking lot

was not the subject of the variance request, and is irrelevant to
the case before the Board of Adjustment and this appeal.
(4) Allys are not included in the rear yards or buffers
required by Salt Lake City ordinances 21.52.060 and 21.78.020.
Salt Lake City Ordinance 21.78.020 provides that where a lot in
any business district abuts a lot in any residential district, a
landscaped buffer of at least ten feet shall be provided along
such abutting line.

Salt Lake City Ordinance 21.04.010 defines

"abutting" to mean "adjacent or contiguous and shall include
property separated by an alley."

Thus, a lot in a business

district "abuts" a lot in a residential district even if there is
an alley separating the two lots.

A landscaped buffer or rear

yard is still required for the business district lot.
9

(5) The fact that the illegal placement of the dumpsters in
the rear yard may have preceded the adoption of the area master
plan is totally irrelevant to the granting of a variance.

The

master plan does not regulate or define dumpster location, rear
yards, or buffers.

A variance, by definition, is permission to

vary from the city's zoning ordinances,

not from the master plan.

The Board failed to connect its "supporting evidence" to any
one of the five criteria listed in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(2).
None of the evidence "marshaled" by the Board of Adjustment in
support of its decision is relevant to whether substantial
evidence supported the Board's decision or to the issue on appeal
as to the lack of findings and the illegality of the Board's
actions.

CONCLUSION
Lastly, the Board argues that petitioners impermissibly
supplemented the administrative record with matters outside the
record, and therefore, summary judgment is an appropriate
sanction for such outrageous behavior.

This argument is so

nonsensical that petitioners will not waste the court's time
refuting it except to note that, thanks to petitioners' efforts,
the Board of Adjustment was forced to supplement the
administrative record

twice.

The Board of Adjustment ignored the merits of petitioners'
argument that it acted illegally in granting the variance.

The

Board's brief does not dispute petitioners' statement of the
facts, the issue, or the case; it does not attempt to distinguish
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the cases or authorities cited by petitioners; it does not point
,to any evidence in the record relevant to the statutory standards
for granting a variance, nor does it cite any cases that are
relevant to the merits.
The Board offers no real opposition to the argument that it
stepped over the boundaries of its legislatively delegated
authority in granting the variances to the Market Street Broiler
& Fish Market.

The district court's grant of summary judgment is

tantamount to saying that the Board may proceed to grant
variances based on its own notions of the best solutions to the
cases that come before it, without any regard to the standards
mandated by the Utah State Legislature, and without any fear of
meaningful judicial review.
Petitioners respectfully request that the Court of Appeals
reverse the decision of the district court granting summary
judgment to the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City
Corporation, and order that the decision of the Board of
Adjustment in Case No. 2150-B be vacated.
Dated this

P

th day of November, 1996.

LINDA LEPREAU
Attorney for Petitioners and Appellants
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